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NOTES AND COMMENTS
The only evidence tending to show that defendant was negligent was that adduced
from the circumstances surrounding the accident before the material facts were
revealed. The testimony of the defendant and his compamon, corroborated by
the very physical facts of the accident, namely, that the car remained stationary
for over thirty minutes, completely erased any circumstantial evidence of de-
fendant's negligence. It is, therefore, earnestly believed that the decision randered
herein was ill-advised, that the trial court's handling of the case was proper, and
that its decision should have been affirmed.'
DELMER ISON
ADOPTED CHILD AS "LEGAL HEIR" UNDER ADOPTIVE
GRANDPARENT'S WILL - ISAACS v. MANNING
The issue in Isaacs v. Manning was whether an adopted daughter of a bene-
ficiary could qualify as heir of the beneficiary under a testamentary trust.' The
will left an estate in trust for the children of the testator, with the following pro-
vision:
"Upon the death of any of my five children the trust
as to a fifth part of my estate allotted to the one so dying shall cease
and the estate held for such child shall be paid to the legal heirs of
such deceased child."
The following statute was in effect at the testator s death:
Carroll's Kentucky Statutes, section 2071, "Any person
may state that he is desirous of adopting a person
and making him capable of inheriting as heir-at-law of such peti-
tioner; and [the] court shall have authority to make an order
declaring such person heir-at-law of such petitioner, and as such cap-
able of inheriting as though such person were the child of such peti-
tioner. I's
64 Mich. 676, -- 31 N.W 578, 581 (1887), has ably set forth the rule in regard
to probabilities: "The jury are not warranted in finding a fact established by
[even] a greater probability, unless, also, the evidence satisfied them that the fact
exists. The conclusion that it exists may be drawn from a preponderance of prob-
abilities in its favor, but the probabilities must be such that the conclusion may
be and is drawn, or it is not proved." In the instant case, the fact to be proved
was one of negligence. The finding by the trial court that there was no evidence
tending to prove that the fact of negligence existed, supported by the valued testi-
mony of the defendant and his companion corroborated by the physical facts of
the accident, certainly warranted the conclusion that the fact of negligence did
not exist and the "probability," if any, was removed, leaving nothing in the scales
to be weighed by the jury against the defendant's evidence.
'Upon retrying the case, a verdict was returned for the plaintiff. No men-
tion of this was made in the case, but it would not be unfair, I think, to regard
the opinion of the appellate court as one in which the court sought either to lay
the loss upon the insurance company or to encourage the carrying of insurance in
the future by the defendant. In either event, the effect of such a policy can only
lead to a higher rate of insurance for automobile owners.
'312 Ky. 326, 227 S.W 2d 418 (1950).
Id. at 326, 227 S.W 2d at 419.
'CARROLL s KENTUCKY STATUTES secs. 2071-2072b, repealed in 1940; Ky.
REv. STAT. sections 405.140-405.240, provisions for adoption, repealed in 1946;
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The facts were that the claimant was legally adopted and the heir-at-law of
her adoptive parent. The adoption occurred over a year before the execution of
the will and over five years before the death of the testator. The court reasonably
assumed because of the time lapse that the testator had received notice of the
adoption. The term "legal heirs" was used, without the addition of any expression
of intent in the will or from the circumstances to limit as to blood. The Court
of Appeals held that the adopted child, although the natural child of another
beneficiary,4 was entitled to take as the legal heir of the adoptive parent, being a
member of the class designated in the will.
The appellees cited the case of Woods v. Crump" as authority for denying
the existence of any claim in the adopted child as a legal heir. That decision
declared that a deed of gift, conveying a life estate to a daughter, with remainder
to her "heirs" in fee simple, did not include as her heir one whom she adopted
forty years after the execution of the deed. This case was distinguished by the
court in the Manning case. The distinguishing grounds stated were the factual
situation and the use of the single term "heirs." Clearly, the facts of the two
cases are distinguishable for in the one there was prior adoption; in the other, a
subsequent adoption. One other factor was mentioned in the opimon of the
principal case. The Woods case, though involving the construction of a deed,
gratuitously discussed an adopted child's right to inherit from others than the
adoptive parents. The Manning case was concerned with a direct bequest under
a will and not intestacy. However, a factual distinguishment does not express
the tenor of the Manning case. The only difference in terminology was the use
of "legal heirs" in the principal case as compared with the word "heirs" in the
Woods case. Yet, the court made reference to an artificial construction of the
word "heirs" and refused to extend the interrretation advanced in the Woods case.
In' most states the adopted child inherits from the adoptive parents,' but gen-
Ky. REv. STAT. sections 405.250-405.280, adoption, repealed in 1950, effective
June 15, 1950; Ky. REv. STAT. (Supp.) sections 199.470-199.590, adopted in 1950,
effective June 15, 1950.
The current sthtute applicable to this problem is Ky. REv. STAT. (Supp.) sec.
199.530 which provides:
(1) After the entry of the order of adoption provided for in KRS 199.520,
the court shall enter a judgment of adoption in which judgment the name of the
child shall be changed to conform with the prayer of the petition, and the judg-
ment, including the caption, shall contain only the adopted name of the child,
without any reference whatsoever to its former name.
(2) Any child adopted pursuant to the provisions of KRS 199.470 to 199.520
shall be considered, for the purposes of inheritance and succession and for all
other legal considerations, the natural, legitimate child of the parents adopting it.
A child so adopted shall be freed from all legal obligations of maintenance and
obedience to its natural parents, except that where the adopting parent of the
child is married to the natural parent of the child, the relation of the child to that
natural parent shall not in any way be altered by the adoption and the rights and
obligations of the natural parent and the adopting parent to the child shall be the
same as if the child were the natural child of both the natural parent and the
adopting parent. The judgment of adoption shall include the applicable pro-
visions of this subsection.
'Although such facts may result in unequal distribution, it was not a con-
trolling consideration as to the issue of the case.
'283 Ky 675, 142 S.W 2d 680 (1940). This decision was criticized as
adopting an artificial construction of the term "heirs" in 29 Ky. L. J. 481
(1940-41).
6 Bilderback v. Clark, 106 Kan. 787, 189 P 977 (1920); Sanderson v. Adams,
278 Ky. 24, 128 S.W 2d 223 (1989)- Lanferman v. Vanzile, 150 Ky. 751, 150
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erally not from the ancestors and collateral kindred of the predeceased adoptive
parent. The prevailing view seems to be that the adoption is personal and
creates no relationship of law between the child and the adoptive parents
kindred.8
Isaacs v. Manning seems contra to Copeland v. State Bank & Trust Co.9 The
will in the latter case created a life trust for the testator s children, and provided
that if a child died without "children" the proportion of the fund being enjoyed
should revert and pass as a gift over. Upon the death of a daughter, the pro-
portionate share reverted to the estate and an adonted child of the daughter
received nothing. The Court of Appeals stated that the term "heirs" and words of
similar import in a will refer to natural and blood relationships and do not in-
clude an adopted child in the absence of circumstances clearly expressing such
an intent. It is to be noted that the word "children" rather than 'heirs" or "legal
heirs" was the term under construction. The adoption in the Copeland case was
subsequent to the execution of the will and the death of the testator; whereas,
the principal case involved a previously adopted child. These facts weaken the
conclusion of a contra holding for they permit the cases to be distinguished.
Construction of the adopted child's right to take under a will does not in-
volve the right of inheritance, but concerns the testator s intention with respect'to
shanng in his estate. The courts tend to limit the word "heirs" in a will so as to
exclude adopted children, except where there is a clear expression of intent to in-
clude an adopted child." This intent may, naturally, be inferred from the language
of the will or from the circumstances of the case. Quite often the language of a
gift over following a life estate or a trust fund for life may be sufficiently definite
to include adopted children of the life tenant or beneficiary. This result is reached
even in face of the prevailing rule to exclude adopted children. The comments
of the Restatement of Properts' express a view favoring the -inclusion of adopted
S.W 1008 (1912); Merritt v. Morton, 148 Ky. 188, 136 S.W 138 (1911);
Atchison v. Atchison s Ex rs., 89 Ky., 488, 12 S.W 942 (1890); Clarkson v.
Biley, 185 Va. 82, 88 S.E. 2d 22 (1946).
In re Pences Estate, 117 Cal. App. 328, 4 P 2d 202 (1931); Woods v.
Crump, 288 Ky. 675, 142 S.W 2d 680 (1940); Sanderson v. Adams, 278 Ky. 24,
128 S.W 2d 228 (1939); Merritt v. Morton, 143 Ky. 188, 186 S.W 188 (1911);
Taylor v. Taylor, 162 Tenn. 482, 40 S.W 2d 893 (1931); In re Estate of Bradley,
185 Wis. 893, 201 N.W 978 (1925); 1 Asr. JuR. ADOPTION, p. 662. The follow-
ing cases have permitted such inheritance, either directly or by representation:
McCune v. Oldham, 218 Iowa 1221, 240 N.W 678 (1932); Denton v. Miller,
110 Kan. 292, 208 P 698 (1922); Stearns v. Allen, 188 Mass. 404, 67 N.E. 849
(1908); In re Waddell's Estate, 181 Wash. 566, 280 P. 822 (1924). "Previous
to the enactment of KRS 405.200, the law was well settled in this jurisdiction that
an adopted child inherits from his foster parent, but does not inherit through such
parent from the latter s kindred." Eversole v. Kentucky River Coal Corp., 298
Ky. 821, 182 S.W 2d 892 (1944). The 1940 adoption act was construed as
enacted to change the existing law as it affected the succession rights of adopted
children. The Kentucky Court held under the 1940 adoption act that adopted
children could inherit through the adoptive parents. Kolb v. Ruhl's Adm r., 808
Ky. 604, 198 S.W 2d 826 (1946).
'Merritt v. Morton, 148 Ky. 188, 186 S.W 188 (1911).
800 Ky. 482, 188 S.W 2d 1017 (1945).10Comer v. Comer, 195 Ga. 79, 28 S.E. 2d 420 (1942); Beck v. Dickinson,
99 Ind. App. 463, 192 N.E. 899 (1984); Cook v. Underwood, 209 Iowa 641, 228
N.W 629 (1980); see Copeland v. State Bank & Trust Co., 800 Ky. at 444, 188
S.W 2d at 1028.
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children as heirs.' This view is positive in that adoption does not )ustify exclusion
in the absence of intent to limit heirs to blood relations.
Although the Kentucky Court -of Appeals, in the latest interpretation of the
word "heirs" has apparently adopted a liberal attitude, the decision falls squarely
within the scope of the general rule construing "heirs" in reference to an adopted
child taking under a will. The factual situation of Isaacs v. Manning would sup-
port the conclusion that a reasonable interpretation shows the existence of the
necessary intent to include the adopted child.
DEmPSEY Cox
IS A LESSOR OF MOTOR VEHICLES A CONTRACT CARRIER?
An increasing number of manufacturers and shippers who are located a
greater distance from their consumers than their competitors face the realization
that the soanng cost of transportation has materially weakened their competitive
position. Others find that new markets have opened up for their products in
places which are served by the existing carners only indirectly or not at all with
the result that the new markets are to them no markets at all. These and other
situations have resulted in a diligent search by the shipper for a cheaper, more
rapid, and more direct conveyance of his products.
One way in which shippers have avoided these difficulties has been the trans-
portation of their goods by some motor earner under contract to haul goods accord-
ing to the route, schedule, and rate which is most suitable for their specific type
of hauling. A route can thus be worked out which is more direct and a schedule
drawn in accordance with production plans. The effect of this is a quicker turn-
over with less need for a large amount of working capital. The one thing that
deters every shipper from accomplishing this seemingly Utopian result is the fact
that every interstate contract earner must obtain a permit from the Interstate
Commerce Commission before he will be allowed to operate over a new route or
haul a new type of goods.' The chances of the manufacturer being able to find
an operating contract earner with the authority to transport the particular goods
over the particular route wanted are comparatively nil. He must then find a
carrier willing to transport his goods according to his specifications. Once this is
done, the carrier must file an application to secure a permit allowing him to so
transport the goods. Due in part, no doubt, to the opposition of nearly every
common earner which operates over any part of the proposed route and the over-
crowded condition of our highways, the Commission has become increasingly reluc-
tant to issue any new permits.'
The shipper may avoid the necessity of complying with these Governmental
controls which are incident to obtaining permits for contract carriers and still re-
tain most of the benefits which are concomitant with that type of shipping by using
his own trucks and men. This method of transportation brings with it, however,
the necessity of buying trucks and repair equipment which might be too great a
" Restatement, Property, sec. 305, comment Y (1940).
149 Stat. 552 (1935), 49 U.S.C. see. 309(a) (1946).
49 Stat. 552 (1935), 49 U.S.C. sec. 309(b) (1946).' From October 31, 1948, to October 31, 1949, the Interstate Commerce
Commission 'withdrew 186 more permits than it granted. Sixty-Third Annual
Report of the Interstate Commerce Commission 104 (1949).
